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To explore the significance of repeated memories for individuals’ personal histories, we compared the
characteristics of young adults’ unique and repeated memories of childhood experiences. Memory type
(unique vs. repeated) was a within-participant variable. In Experiment 1, college-age participants
generated as many early memories as possible in 4 minutes; in Experiment 2, another sample provided
complete reports of five early memories in each condition. In both experiments, participants rated the
vividness, biographical importance and personal meaning of each memory and labelled the accompany-
ing emotion. Unique memories were more vivid than repeated memories as well as more likely to include
negative emotion, regardless of the method of reporting. Most importantly, college students rated their
memories for unique and repeated events as equivalently infused with personal meaning. Analysis of the
content of the memories reported in Experiment 2 established that unique and repeated memories did
not differ in word count or percentages of perceptual terms or words indicating positive affect, although
unique memories contained a greater percentage of negative affect. Additional analyses of content
provided evidence for differences in the functions served by unique and repeated memories. The results
have implications for the study of autobiographical memory and for identifying over-general memories.
Keywords: Autobiographical memory; Childhood; Life story; Repeated events; Unique events.
Our lives largely comprise everyday events, and
some of those events occur almost every day, at
least for periods of time. Despite the extent to
which repeated episodes constitute lived experi-
ence, they have traditionally been excluded from
conceptualisations of autobiographical memory.
For example, Nelson and Fivush (2004) define
autobiographical memory as “an explicit memory
of an event that occurred in a specific time and
place in one’s personal past” (p. 486). Recently,
however, Rubin and Umanath (2015) have chal-
lenged the assumption that event memory must
consist of unique episodes. They argue that some
episodes are so similar that they are reported as
a single scene at recall and that “the properties
and construction of such repeated events overlap
too heavily with those of unique events to be
considered fundamentally different from them”
(p. 10). In this paper, we contribute to the
understanding of the similarities and distinctions
between memories of unique versus repeated
events, focusing particularly on the personal
importance and content of these two categories
of memories for childhood experiences. The
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examination of childhood memories allowed us to
explore the extent to which memories of unique
versus repeated events are available as influences
on the self-concept and life story (Habermas &
Bluck, 2000) at emerging adulthood.
Consistent with Waters, Bauer, and Fivush
(2014), we define unique memories as reports of
past single events experienced by the participant
at a particular time and place, and repeated
memories as representations of personally experi-
enced events that occurred on multiple occasions
and involved primarily the same people and
setting. Although Rubin and Umanath (2015)
categorise both these types of memory as event
memory, they classify only unique memories as
episodic. Both categories of unique and repeated
memories exclude reports of extended events,
defined by Waters et al. (2014) as important
experiences or periods of life that may represent
an amalgam of single and recurring events (see
also Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Extended
memories provide summaries of a significant time
in one’s life, such as trips to Disneyland, one’s
first year of school, and other events that hap-
pened over a continuous and protracted period of
time. Within these extended memories, one can
often isolate memories of unique or repeated
events (or both) that occurred during the period
of life being recalled.
Repeated or recurring memories should not be
confused with scripts. According to Schank and
Abelson (1977), a script is “a structure that
describes an appropriate sequence of events in a
particular context” (p. 151). As investigated by
Nelson and her colleagues (see Nelson, 1986),
scripts are schemas that provide generic event
representations. Hence, scripts convey the typical
acts that comprise particular events (e.g., having
dinner in a restaurant) in the order in which
they occur and accommodate variations in the
prototypical experience (e.g., through slot fillers
and conditional acts). Abundant research evid-
ence establishes that scripts have broad implica-
tions for understanding and remembering events
and contribute to cognitive development (Nelson
& Gruendel, 1986). However, scripts do not
represent an individual’s personal experience.
Notably, scripted events are described in the
second rather than the first person and in the
present rather than the past tense (e.g., “You
follow the hostess to your table”). In contrast,
repeated events as provided by participants in
reporting early memories denote the experiences
of the self (“I”), including thoughts, reactions and
emotions. Further, repeated memories often
reflect personal awareness of the event as it
unfolds, for example, in discussing sensory details
of the experience. These properties are typically
listed as defining characteristics of autobiograph-
ical memories by memory researchers (e.g.,
Bauer, 2007; Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Thus,
repeated event reports appear to share more
characteristics with unique memories than with
scripts. Indeed, repeated memories arguably dif-
fer from the unique episodes typically defined as
autobiographical memory in only one regard:
they happen more than once.
Furthermore, repeated memories are not man-
ifestations of the phenomenon of over-general
memory. As defined by Williams et al. (2007),
patients with depression or histories of trauma, in
comparison to normal controls, more frequently
summarise categories of events when asked to
recall specific memories in response to cue words,
thus demonstrating over-general memory. Con-
way and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose a hier-
archical search model to explain this pattern. In
this model, over-general memories are reported
because an individual truncates a search of mem-
ory prematurely in order to avoid exposure to
representations of distressing experiences. As a
result, their reported memories consist of brief
and unelaborated reports of categories of experi-
ence (e.g., “all the times I’ve failed exams”;
Williams et al., 2007, p. 123). Although references
to extended periods of the lifespan (e.g., “my first
semester of university”; Williams et al., 2007,
p. 123) were initially considered as indicators of
over-general memory, such memories, in contrast
to broad categorical reference, were not found
to differentiate suicidal patients and controls
(Williams & Dritschel, 1992) and would now be
described as extended memories. In contrast to
over-general memories, repeated memories as
examined in the present research may be reports
of quite specific events (“having Thanksgiving
dinner with all my cousins at my grandmother’s
house”) rather than instantiations of a category
(“dinner time at home”) and differ from over-
general memories in that the event in question
occurred on multiple occasions. In addition, by
definition repeated memories could be compar-
able to specific event reports with regard to the
amount of detail and inclusion of emotion.
Hence, repeated memories cannot be considered
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as the product of a truncated retrieval process
(Rubin & Umanath, 2015).
Despite the possibility that repeated events are
part of autobiographical memory, researchers
have excluded such reports from consideration
in many investigations of early childhood mem-
ories. For example, using a cue word procedure,
researchers have asked for reports of memories
for specific, one-time events with both child
(Bauer, Burch, Scholin, & Guler, 2007) and adult
(Jack & Hayne, 2007; Rubin, 2000) participants.
Similarly, in studies eliciting narrative reports
of earliest memories, children (Cleveland &
Reese, 2008; Picard, Reffuveille, Eustache, &
Piolino, 2009; Tustin & Hayne, 2010), adolescents
(Jack, McDonald, Reese, & Hayne, 2009; Reese,
Jack, & White, 2010), and adults (Bruce, Wilcox-
O’Hearn, Robinson, Phillips-Grant, Francis, &
Smith, 2005; Jack & Hayne, 2007; Mullen, 1994
[Study 3]) were instructed to describe only unique
events. In contrast, a number of studies of
memory for early childhood events have not
limited participants’ reports to unique episodes.
These investigations include the administration of
the cue word procedure with adults (Wang, 2006);
elicitation of reports with both children (Peterson,
Grant, & Boland, 2005; Peterson, Morris, Baker-
Ward, & Flynn, 2014; Peterson, Wang, & Hou,
2009) and adults (Artioli, Cicogna, Occhionero, &
Reese, 2012; Peterson, Smorti, & Tani, 2008); and
the presentation of a fluency task to children
(Peterson et al., 2009) and adults (Peterson
et al., 2008).
When individuals are not constrained by the
requirement to limit their reports of early mem-
ories to unique episodes, they typically report
both one-time and repeated events. In these
investigations, reports of repeated events
occurred frequently. Among children, Peterson
et al. (2009) classified almost half the reported
memories as describing repeated experiences, and
Peterson et al. (2005) categorised about a quarter
of children’s memories as repeated. Among adult
participants, both Wang (2006) and Peterson et al.
(2008) reported that about half the reports of
early childhood events consisted of accounts of
repeated experiences.
It is clear that, when allowed to do so,
participants define their childhood memories as
involving both unique and repeated experiences.
But do the two types of memories serve the same
function in autobiographical memory? Waters
et al. (2014) asked adults to generate both unique
and repeated memories in two studies (extended
memories were also included in one of the
studies) and explored the functions served by
these memories: self-definition, social connection,
and directing future behaviour. They used nar-
rative coding of the memories as well as ques-
tionnaire measures about narrative function filled
out by the participants themselves in Study 2 and
found that adults’ memories of both unique and
repeated events seemed to serve a self-defining
function, although memories of unique events
were more frequently identified as serving this
function than were repeated memories. However,
the timeframe for the recalled events was not
specified, and thus memories were likely from
relatively recent periods of the participants’ lives.
Do repeated memories from early childhood,
as frequently reported by participants in describ-
ing their childhood, also play an important role in
identity? It makes sense that the similar episodes
that comprise life as it unfolds, along with unique
events, would serve to define characteristics of
the self. Illustrating this possibility, famed biolo-
gist E.O. Wilson begins his autobiography (1994)
with stories of the repeated as well as unique
experiences embedded within his memory for an
extended period of his life, and discussed all these
memories as having initially established his iden-
tity as a naturalist. As a young child, he spent one
summer at Paradise Beach, Florida (extended
memory). He describes how every morning he
would comb the beach, wading in and out of
the water, looking for interesting forms of life
(repeated memory). He also discusses one-time
events, including encountering a gigantic ray,
which he subsequently repeatedly tried to catch
[unique memory]. Wilson considers all these
experiences part of his autobiography: “Why do
I tell you this little boy’s story of medusas, rays,
and sea monsters, almost 60 years after the fact?
Because it illustrates, I think, how a naturalist is
created” (1994, p. 11).
In this investigation, we explore the similarity
of repeated and unique event reports with refer-
ence to a number of the defining characteristics of
autobiographical memory among young adults
describing early childhood experiences. We con-
ducted two studies in which participants reported
both unique and repeated early memories. Study 1
used a fluency task (Wang, Conway, & Hou,
2004), in which participants generated as many
early memories as possible in a specified period
of time. This procedure is seen as providing an
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indication of the accessibility of early memories.
In Study 2, participants provided detailed descrip-
tions of a specified number of childhood memor-
ies. The use of a different methodology enabled
us to examine additional characteristics of their
memories as well as to overcome some limitations
in the initial study.
Given our interest in the significance of these
types of memories in constructing identity, we
asked our participants in both studies to rate the
likelihood that a reported event would be included
in their potential future biographies. In addition,
to minimise the risk that participants may hesitate
to publicly share some childhood experiences, we
obtained separate ratings of the personal signific-
ance of both types of events. Also, consistent with
most research on early autobiographical experi-
ence, we obtained additional information about
these memories, including the age at which the
experience occurred (e.g., Rubin, 2000), the
emotional valence of the memory (e.g., Talarico,
LaBar, & Rubin, 2004), and its vividness (e.g.,
Jansari & Parkin, 1996). In examining memory
reports, we also compared word count and char-
acterised both unique and repeated memories in
terms of the inclusion of words representing
perception and positive and negative affect. These
measures provided indicators of the extent to
which memories in the two categories differed in
detail and in inclusion of personal experience. In
addition, to explore the different functions of
memories in different categories, we compared
the inclusion of terms referring to the self, social
partners, and cognitive insight in repeated and
unique memories. In this way, we built on the
recent work of Waters et al. (2014) with a different
methodology (i.e. ratings vs. narrative content).
Based on participants’ frequent reporting of
both unique and repeated childhood experiences,
which sometimes even occur in equivalent propor-
tions in unconstrained recall (Peterson, Smorti, &
Tani, 2008; Peterson, Bonechi, Smorti, & Tani,
2010), we expected that the ratings of the public
and personal significance of both types of memor-
ies would be comparable. In contrast, we predicted
that unique memories would be rated as more
vivid, reflecting their distinctiveness (Howe, 1997).
We also expected differences in the emotions
associated with the memories. We assumed that
for children in stable life circumstances, everyday
experiences in childhood consist largely of mildly
positive content (e.g., Morris, Baker-Ward, &
Bauer, 2010), and that this would be typically
true for our sample of college students. Hence, we
predicted that repeated memories would be less
likely to be accompanied by negative emotion
because they were less likely than unique memor-
ies to refer to unusual events such as injuries. We
also expected to observe differences in the content
of the two categories of memories, corresponding
to the functions identified by Waters et al. (2014).
EXPERIMENT 1: MEMORY FLUENCY
Method
Participants. A total of 44 participants, all of
whom were students at a public university in the
Southeastern United States, were recruited for this
investigation. All participants were at least 18
years of age and native speakers of English. They
were all enrolled in introduction to psychology
courses, and their participation fulfilled one option
for course credit. A total of three participants did
not contribute data to the study: the first because
of disclosure of a developmental disability; the
second due to equipment malfunction; and the
third, because all reports of repeated memories
extended beyond the target age range of 6.5.
Hence, the final sample consisted of 41 partici-
pants, 16 of whom were female. The dispropor-
tionate inclusion of male participants reflects the
characteristics of students in a course meeting a
general education requirement in an institution
with strong programmes that have traditionally
attracted fewer female students. Further repre-
senting the student population of the university,
the sample was primarily European American
(82.90%), with 14.60% of the participants self-
identified as African-American, and the remaining
2.40% (one student) categorised as Other. Six
undergraduate research assistants, five females
and one male, all of whom were European Amer-
ican, conducted all the interviews.
Procedure. All participants were interviewed
individually in a laboratory room in the Psycho-
logy building. Interviews were audio recorded
and subsequently transcribed for further analysis.
Participants were asked to complete two memory
fluency tasks (Wang et al., 2004), one for mem-
ories of unique events (defined as experiences
that occurred on only one occasion) and the other
for memories of repeated events. The order of
the two fluency tasks was counterbalanced across
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participants. In the fluency task for unique mem-
ories, participants were given 4 minutes to recall
as many one-time memories for events that
occurred before they entered elementary school
(operationally defined as below 6.5 years of age)
as they could. After the 4 minutes had passed,
participants were asked to provide their ages, in
years and months, at the time of each reported
event. Following procedures used in previous
research (Peterson & Nguyen, 2010), interviewers
provided prompts (e.g., season of the year) as
needed to help the participant accurately date
the remembered event. Participants were also
asked to report the vividness of each memory
on a Likert scale (1 = very vague, 7 = vivid), and
the emotion, if any, that was attached to the
memory.
The fluency task for repeated memories was
identical to the fluency task for unique memories,
except participants were asked to report memor-
ies of events that occurred on multiple occasions.
After the completion of the 4-minute fluency
task, participants were asked to rate the vividness
of the memory and describe the accompanying
emotion, as described above. Additionally, parti-
cipants reported the age in years and months in
which the repeated event first began and the age
at which the event ended.
After completion of these two memory tasks,
participants were asked to report the biographical
importance of each memory they recalled on a
Likert scale (1 = definitely NOT include, 7 =
definitely include). Specifically, the participants
were instructed to:
Pretend that at some point in the future you have
become famous. Someone is writing a biography
about you, and you would like to tell the story of
your life, the events that were important or
interesting or helped make you who you are.
You would like others to know you. For each of
the memories you gave, how likely are you to
include that memory as something to go into
your biography, to tell the story of your life?
Participants were also asked to rate the pri-
vate significance of each memory on a Likert
scale (1 = definitely NOT important, 7 = definitely
important). There instructions were as follows:
In thinking about your life and the memories you
have of it, some memories are salient, important,
interesting, or in other ways significant, but you
may not want to include them in a biography.
They are important for you privately, but not
necessarily for public consumption. For each of
the memories that you gave, how important or
significant is that memory for you personally?
All procedures were approved by the Univer-
sity’s Institutional Review Board
Coding. For unique events, the participant’s
estimated age at which the event occurred (age at
encoding) in years was analysed. In the event that
the participant could only specify a given year
(“when I was 4”), the midpoint of the interval (4.5
years) was analysed.
Memories for events participants identified as
occurring after childhood, operationalised as at or
after 10.5 years, were omitted. We chose this age
to correspond to the period of life prior to the
typical end of the elementary school years. This
period exceeded the target age range of below
age 6.5 that was defined in the instructions;
however, preliminary analyses revealed the same
pattern of effects of condition when memories
were omitted that occurred beyond age 6.5, with
the only differences involving the effects of
gender in one analysis and order in another.
The extended age range made it possible to
include an additional 119 memories. With the
boundary defined as 10.5 years, no unique mem-
ories were deleted; however, 145 (36.99%) of the
repeated memories failed to meet the criteria for
inclusion. This figure reflects the fact that many
repeated events continued beyond the 10.5-year
boundary. Although memories for events that
transpired before 1.5 years would not have been
included in the analyses, no memories dating
from this period of life were reported in either
condition. (Memories for repeated events begin-
ning before 1.5 years of age but continuing
beyond that period were included.)
The label of the emotion accompanying each
memory as generated by the participant was
classified into the following categories: positive,
negative, neutral, or mixed. This classification was
based on the categories for positive and negative
affect as included in the standard dictionary used
with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) software (Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland,
Gonzales, & Booth, 2007). The neutral category
consisted of words without positive or negative
affect, and the mixed category comprised reports
that included both positive and negative affect
terms. Because the coding was objective, in that it
involved only the identification of the presence or
absence of the term in the LIWC dictionary
categories for positive and negative affect,
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reliability was not calculated. No data reduction
was necessary for the ratings of vividness, bio-
graphical importance, and personal significance.
Results
Reflecting the application of the exclusion criteria
described above there were, not surprisingly,
more unique (N = 318) than repeated (N = 247)
memories. The characteristics of the unique and
repeated memories are indicated in Table 1.
Overall, the two categories of memories were
characterised by greater similarity than difference.
To analyse these data, multilevel modelling
(MLM) was used in order to control for the
nesting of memories within participants (e.g.,
Morris et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2014). In
each of these analyses, we first conducted a
preliminary analysis with no predictors included
to determine whether there was sufficient variab-
ility between and within subjects to test the
hypothesis (e.g., Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
Additional preliminary analyses were then con-
ducted to determine whether performance dif-
fered by gender or order of presentation of the
memory tasks. No main effects were observed for
any outcome; consequently, the final models did
not include these variables. Condition (unique = 0;
repeated = 1) was added to each model as a level 1
predictor. In each of these analyses, the following
general model was used to examine within-subject
effects between the major dependent variable
under consideration and condition. All the follow-
ing models are represented in Table 2.
Level 1 : DVij ¼ b0ij þ b1i UNIQUEvs:REPEATEDð Þ
þ rij
Level 2 : b0i ¼ c00 þ u0i
b1i ¼ c10 þ u1i
As indicated above, all models initially allowed
for the slopes to vary (u1i). However, we found
either no significant variability around the slope
or a better fit for the model in which the slopes
were constrained [i.e. larger Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) value and significant difference
between an indicator of fit, minus twice the
residual log likelihood (-2LL), in the two models;
Singer, 1998]. Therefore, all models were
reported with constrained slopes (i.e. deletion
of u1i).
Vividness. Participants rated their unique mem-
ories as more vivid than their repeated memories.
The fully unconditional model indicated that
24.71% of the variability was between subjects
(τ00 = .47, z = 3.56, p = .0002) and 75.29% was
within subjects (σ2 = 1.42, z = 16.19, p < .0001).
With condition included in the model, partici-
pants rated unique memories as significantly
more vivid (M = 5.47, SD = 1.28) than repeated
memories (M = 4.98, SD = 1.43; γ10 = −.50, t =
−5.00, p < .0001). Approximately 4.43% of the
within-person variance in vividness was accounted
for by condition.
TABLE 1
Characteristics of unique and repeated memories across
participants (Experiment 1)
Mean (SD) Range for mean
Unique condition
Agea 4.24 (0.93) 1.58–6.67
Vividness 5.47 (1.28) 2–7
Biographical importance 3.79 (1.91) 1–7
Personal significance 4.15 (1.95) 1–7
Repeated condition
Agea 5.09 (1.16) 1.63–9.54
Vividness 4.98 (1.43) 1–7
Biographical importance 3.63 (1.91) 1–7
Personal significance 4.20 (1.96) 1–7
aAge refers to the age at which the unique was encoded or
the participant’s age at the midpoint of the duration of the
repeated event.
TABLE 2
Results of tests of multilevel models (Experiment 1)
Dependent variables for each model
Vividness
rating
Averaged
biographic and
self-importance
rating
Fixed effects
Dependent variable, β0
Intercept, γ00 5.45** (.13) 3.96** (.17)
Condition slope, β1
Condition, γ10 −.50** (.10) −.07 (.13)
Random effects
Variable level, τ00 .47** (.13) .91** (.25)
Within-person
fluctuation, σ2
1.36** (.08) 2.30** (.14)
Standard error values are in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
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Emotion. Ten memories were not coded for
emotion because the participant provided a term
that did not indicate an emotion (e.g., hungry). A
logistic MLM analysis was conducted with macro
%GLIMMIX in SAS software (Guo & Zhao,
2000) to examine the emotion attached to each
included memory. Logistic MLM is appropriate
for this model because the outcome variable of
emotion was coded as a dichotomous variable.
Emotion was categorised into having no negative
component (i.e. positive or neutral; coded as 0) or
having a negative component (i.e. negative or
mixed, coded at 1). The independent variable,
condition (i.e. unique or repeated), remained the
only level 1 predictor, consistent with the previ-
ous model. The fully unconditional model indi-
cated that the average odds of the memory having
an associated negative emotion was .55. When
condition was included in the model as a level 1
predictor, repeated memories were associated
with less likelihood of having an associated
negative emotion (M = 0.21, SD = 0.41) com-
pared to unique memories (M = 0.46, SD = 0.50,
OR = .29, t = −6.40, p < .0001). In other words,
repeated memories were .29 times less likely to
have an associated negative emotion compared to
unique memories. This model explained 2.29%
of the within-person variance in emotion (see
Table 3).
Biographical importance and personal signi‐
ficance. As indicated in Table 1, both unique
and repeated memories were seen as having
moderate importance and personal significance
in an understanding of the participant’s life,
although we observed a full range of responding.
Because these ratings were highly correlated, r =
.69, p < .001, we analysed the average of the two.
The fully unconditional model indicated that
28.40% of the variability was between subjects
(τ00 = .91, z = 3.68, p = .0001) and 71.60% was
within subjects (σ2 = 2.29, z = 16.19, p < .0001).
No difference between the average of the two
scores of unique and repeated memories was
observed when condition was added to the model
(γ10 = −.07, t = −0.51, p = .61). (We note that no
differences between conditions were found when
the ratings were analysed separately.)
To further explore the significance of unique
and repeated memories, we examined only those
memories rated on average as 6 or above on the
two 7-point rating scales referencing the import-
ance of inclusion in biographies of the partici-
pants’ lives (7 = definitely include). The use of a
paired-sample t-test revealed that the average
percentage of unique memories rated as 6 or
above (M = 20.76, SD = 23.43) was not signifi-
cantly different from the average percentage of
repeated memories rated as 6 or above (M =
17.19, SD = 19.66), t(40) = 0.99, p = .33.
Discussion
Consistent with our hypotheses, this initial com-
parison of memories for unique and repeated
experiences revealed both similarities and differ-
ences. Most importantly, participants rated their
repeated memories and their unique memories as
comparably significant for the understanding of
their lives. In addition, when only the most
important memories were selected, repeated
memories were as likely as unique memories to
be included.
As hypothesised, memories for unique events
were rated as more vivid than repeated memor-
ies, corresponding to the greater salience in
memory of more distinctive events (Howe,
1997). As further hypothesised, repeated memor-
ies were less likely to include negative emotion.
This finding may correspond to the infrequent
occurrence of salient negative events in the daily
experience of children from generally stable
backgrounds. This is not to say that events
involving negative emotions (e.g., disputes with
playmates) do not frequently occur in children’s
TABLE 3
Logistic multilevel model of results for emotion associated
with the memory (Experiment 1)
Variable
Estimate
(SE)
Odds
ratio LCI UCI
Fixed effects
Probability of emotion, β0
Intercept, γ00 −.11 (.15) .90 .66 1.21
Condition slope, β1
Condition, γ10 −1.24 (.19) .29** .20 .42
Random effects
Variable level, τ00 .42* (.19)
Within-person
fluctuation, σ2
.93** (.06)
LCI = lower boundary of the 95% confidence interval;
UCI = upper boundary of the 95% confidence interval.
Deviance = 619.42. n = 555 memories (10 memories were
excluded due to the absence of reports of associated emo-
tions). Standard error values are in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
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lives; however, such everyday experiences are not
likely to be distinctive. Highly negative events
(e.g., significant injuries), are likely to be relatively
rare among well-nurtured children. In this regard,
our sample of college students, as a group, may not
be representative of the broader population, and
this finding may or may not apply to individuals
from backgrounds characterised by adversity.
A limitation of this experiment is the reliance
on very brief reports of memories in the fluency
task. To examine the replicability of the results of
Experiment 1 using a complementary methodo-
logy and to further elucidate the nature of
repeated memories, we conducted Experiment 2,
in which college students provided narrative
accounts of their five earliest memories of both
unique and repeated experiences. These partici-
pants were encouraged to provide as much
information as possible about each memory. We
also requested participants’ reports of the period
of time during which each event reported as a
repeated memory occurred and the frequency of
the occurrence of the event each week during this
duration. This information, in conjunction with
examination of the content of the memory,
enabled us to examine the inclusion of memories
of extended events (i.e. reports of events that
transpired over a period of time, such as three-
day car trips; Waters et al., 2014). We also tested
for replication of the findings of Experiment 1
regarding the characteristics of the memories in
each category. In addition, we examined the
length of each report and the inclusion of specific
terms. To examine possible converging evidence
for ratings of vividness and emotion, we exam-
ined the percentages of words representing per-
ception and affect, respectively. To explore
possible instantiations of the different functions
of unique memories and repeated memories
(Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Waters
et al., 2014), we analysed “I” terms and words
indicating cognitive insight, predicting a greater
percentage among unique memories, and social
words and “we” terms, hypothesising a greater
percentage among repeated memories.
EXPERIMENT 2: DETAILED MEMORY
REPORTS
Method
Participants. A new sample of 45 native
English-speaking participants, all of whom were
18 years of age or older, was recruited from the
same source as described above. Data contribu-
ted by one participant who was an outlier with
regard to age (52 years) were not included. The
final sample thus consisted of 44 participants, 16
of whom were female. With regard to the racial
composition of the sample, 77.30% identified as
European American and 13.60% as African-
American, with the remaining 9.10% of the
participants (N = 4) classified as Other, a category
that included Latina/Latino, Asian American, and
Native American. The same six undergraduate
research assistants involved in Experiment 1 also
conducted the interviews for Experiment 2.
Procedure. Procedures for the two experiments
differed only with regard to the method used to
obtain the memory reports. Participants were
asked to provide full reports of five memories
for unique events and five memories for repeated
events. The order of report of unique versus
repeated events was again counterbalanced
across participants. Participants were read the
following instructions for the reports of unique
and repeated memories, respectively.
We are interested in hearing about five of your
earliest memories from before kindergarten. We
want you to recall as much information about
these memories as possible. These memories
need to be unique events, that is, they happened
only one time. The researchers will write some
notes about each memory and ask you to answer
questions about them as well. Are you ready?
What is your very earliest memory? [If necessary,
the interviewer prompted for reports of the
participant’s next four earliest unique memories]
We are interested in hearing about five of your
earliest memories from before kindergarten. We
want you to recall as much information about these
memories as possible. These memories need to be
repeated events, that is, they happened more than
once. The researchers will write some notes about
each memory and ask you to answer questions
about them as well. Are you ready? What is your
very earliest memory? [If necessary, the inter-
viewer prompted for reports of next four earliest
repeated memories]
After the participants completed each report of
both the unique and repeated memories, the
interviewer prompted the participants to ensure
that they provided all the information they could
remember. After reporting each memory, partici-
pants were asked to provide the same information
regarding the memory as described above: age at
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the time of the reported unique memory or at the
first and last occurrences of the repeated memory
and the frequency with which the repeated event
occurred during this duration, vividness of the
memory (1–7), and the associated emotion as
labelled by the participant. After completion of
these two memory tasks, participants were again
asked to rate (1–7) the biographical importance
and private significance of each memory they
recalled.
Coding. The same criteria for the inclusion of
memory reports as cited for Experiment 1 were
used in this experiment. Further, the previous
procedures for coding age, emotional valence of
the memory as labelled by the participant, and
biographical importance and personal significance
were again applied. To confirm participants’
compliance with the instructions, each memory
in each condition was coded as unique, repeated,
or extended. Memories reported in response to
either the repeated or unique prompts were
classified as extended if the narrative indicated
that the event transpired over a period of one day
or more. To examine the content of the memor-
ies, we used the LIWC programme developed by
Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis (2007). This
computer-based word count programme matches
written transcripts against an extensive dictionary
and generates the percentage of words in a large
set of categories and subcategories. As reported
by Pennebaker, Chung, et al. (2007), this widely
used computer tally system provides reliable and
exhaustive counts, categorising approximately
85% of specific words used in a wide corpus of
narratives. Following the instructions provided by
Pennebaker, Booth, et al. (2007), we transcribed
the interviews verbatim and then edited them to
delete dysfluencies and repetitions. The following
categories were selected from LIWC for analysis:
word count, positive emotion, negative emotion,
perception, “I,” “we,” social terms (e.g., “people,”
“relationship”), and cognitive insight (e.g., “un-
derstood,” “realised”). As discussed above, we
selected these categories in order to compare the
extent of the reports, to correspond to ratings
(perception, emotion), or to enable an examina-
tion of the function of the memories (“I,” “we,”
social, cognitive insight). Word count was simply
the number of words in the edited transcript. The
remaining dependent measures represented the
percentages of words in the report that were
assigned to each category.
Results
With the exception of one participant who
reported only four unique memories, all partici-
pants reported all five requested memories in
each condition. We applied the criteria for includ-
ing memories as in Experiment 1, with deleted
memories extending beyond the age limit of 10.5
years (4 unique memories and 59 repeated mem-
ories deleted). Additionally, after analyzing the
narratives, five repeated and one unique memory
were deleted because the memory did not fit into
the appropriate category (i.e. the participant
reported a repeated memory as a unique memory
and vice versa). In addition, we classified as
extended memories a total of 10 memories
reported in response to the prompt for unique
memories and 2 memories generated when
repeated memories were requested. These mem-
ories were deleted from the analysis. Therefore,
across participants, we analysed 200 (8.68%
excluded) unique and 158 (28.18% excluded)
repeated memories.
We examined the characteristics of repeated
memories to ensure that they were distinct from
unique as well as extended event reports. Partici-
pants indicated that the events described in the
repeated memory reports had occurred over a
period of 2.07 years on average (SD = 1.55) and
during this period, had been repeated an average
of 2.43 times per week (SD = 2.28). These data
were reported for each included repeated mem-
ory. Hence, participants complied with the
instructions to produce repeated event reports.
Inspection of the memories further indicated that
a total of 22 repeated memories included an
embedded description of a particular instantiation
of the repeated event. The content of this report
was deleted prior to analysis of the content of the
memories, but the repeated memory was included
in the analysis. Similarly, the one unique memory
that included a description of a repeated, related
memory was included, but the additional informa-
tion was deleted. The characteristics of the
unique and repeated memories are indicated in
Table 4.
MLM was again used in order to control for
the nesting of memories within participants. The
procedures described above were again followed,
and the same general model was tested in each
analysis. As in Experiment 1, all slopes were
constrained. In comparison to Experiment 1,
preliminary analyses revealed one main effect of
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order when included in the model and one main
effect of gender. When the effects were found,
order and/or gender were included in the main
analysis for that particular dependent variable.
The models are shown in Table 5.
Vividness. The participants’ ratings of the
vividness of their reported memories, as shown
in Table 4, were similar to those ratings reported
for Experiment 1. The fully unconditional model
indicated that 33.50% of the variability was
between subjects (τ00 = .58, z = 3.74, p < .0001)
and 66.50% was within subjects (σ2 = 1.15, z =
12.56, p < .0001). With condition added to the
model, as in Experiment 1, unique memories
(M = 5.17, SD = 1.32) were again rated as
significantly more vivid than repeated memories
(M = 4.69, SD = 1.27, γ10 = −.41, t = −3.60, p =
.0004) (see Table 5). This model accounted for
approximately 3.33% of the within-person vari-
ance in vividness.
Emotion. As in the first experiment, a logistic
MLM analysis was conducted to examine the
emotion attached to each memory. Emotion was
categorised into having no negative component
(i.e. positive or neutral; coded as 0) or having a
negative component (i.e. negative or mixed,
coded at 1). The independent variable, condition
(i.e. unique or repeated), remained the only level
1 predictor, consistent with the previous models.
Ten memories were not analysed because there
was no attached emotion or the term given was
not an emotion (e.g., mischievousness, concentra-
tion). The fully unconditional model indicated
that the average odds of the memory having an
associated negative emotion was .81. When con-
dition was included in the model as a level 1
predictor, repeated memories were associated
with less likelihood of having an associated
negative emotion (M = 0.28, SD = 0.45) com-
pared to unique memories (M = 0.58, SD = 0.50,
OR = .28, t = − 5.49, p < .0001). In other words,
repeated memories were .28 times less likely to
have an associated negative emotion compared
to unique memories. The percentage of within-
person variance explained was negative and was
therefore not interpretable (see Table 6).
Biographical importance and personal signi‐
ficance. Given that the biographical importance
and personal significance ratings were again
highly correlated (r = .66, p < .001), the average
of the two variables was analysed. As was
observed in Experiment 1, both the unique and
repeated memories were rated as moderately
important for inclusion in a biography. The fully
unconditional model indicated that 19.78% of the
variability was between subjects (τ00 = .61, z =
3.02, p = .001) and 80.22% was within subjects
(σ2 = 2.49, z = 12.52, p < .0001). When condition
was added to the model, there was not a signific-
ant difference in condition (γ10 = .16, t = 0.91, p =
.36), thus indicating that reported memories for
unique and repeated experiences were seen as
comparably important for telling the story of
participants’ lives. (As in Experiment 1, no
condition differences were observed when the
ratings were analysed separately.)
TABLE 4
Characteristics of unique and repeated memories across
participants (Experiment 2)
Mean (SD) Range for mean
Unique condition
Agea 4.77 (1.48) 1.50–10.42
Vividness 5.17 (1.32) 1–7
Biographical importance 3.88 (1.97) 1–7
Personal significance 4.25 (1.99) 1–7
Repeated condition
Agea 5.26 (1.15) 1.38–8.29
Vividness 4.69 (1.27) 1–7
Biographical importance 3.95 (1.81) 1–7
Personal significance 4.40 (1.92) 1–7
aAge refers to the participant’s report of the age at which
the unique was encoded or the participant’s age at the
midpoint of the duration of the repeated event.
TABLE 5
Results of tests of multilevel models (Experiment 2)
Dependent variables for each model
Vividness rating
Averaged
biographic and
self-importance
rating
Fixed effects
Dependent variable, β0
Intercept, γ00 5.16** (.14) 4.02** (.16)
Condition slope, β1
Condition, γ10 −.41** (.11) .16 (.17)
Random effects
Variable level, τ00 .57** (.15) .62* (.21)
Within-person
fluctuation, σ2
1.11** (.09) 2.49** (.20)
Standard error values are in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
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To further explore the significance of unique
and repeated memories, we examined only those
memories rated as 6 or 7 on average on the 7-
point rating scales referencing the importance of
inclusion in biographies of the participants’ lives
(7 = definitely include). The percentage of unique
memories rated as 6 or above (M = 20.95, SD =
22.02) was not significantly different from the
percentage of repeated memories rated as 6 or
above (M = 20.23, SD = 25.92), t(43) = 0.16,
p = .87.
Content of the memories (LIWC data). Eleven
additional unique memories and 11 repeated
memories were excluded from this analysis due
to the poor quality of the audio file. See Table 7
for descriptive statistics for each variable indicat-
ing memory content. The content of the memor-
ies was analysed using multi-level modelling.
Slopes were again constrained. See Table 8 for
the MLM models we analysed.
Word count. The first model examined whether
the unique and repeated memories differed in
total length (i.e. word count). The fully uncondi-
tional model for word count indicated that
52.28% of the variability was between subjects
(τ00 = 1912.57, z = 4.05, p < .0001) and 47.72%
was within subjects (σ2 = 1745.67, z = 12.10, p <
.0001). Order (unique then repeated = 0,
repeated then unique = 1) was a significant
predictor and was therefore included in the
analysis. With order and condition in the model,
condition (γ10 = −4.13, t = −0.88, p = .38) was not
significantly related to word count. However,
memories that were recalled in the first condition
(M = 125.27, SD = 65.15), regardless whether
unique or repeated, contained significantly more
words compared to memories that were recalled
in the second condition (M = 84.41, SD = 41.04;
γ01 = −36.95, t = −2.82, p = .0073). Order
accounted for approximately 17.10% of the
between-person variance in word count.
Perception. This model tested whether there
was a difference between conditions in percent-
age of perception words in the narratives. The
fully unconditional model indicated that 7.37% of
the variability was between subjects (τ00 = .29, z =
1.73, p = .04) and 92.63% was within subjects
(σ2 = 3.66, z = 12.15, p < .0001). When condition
was added to the model, condition (γ10 = .05, t =
0.26, p = .80) was not significantly related to
percentage of perception words.
Positive affect. This model was tested to deter-
mine whether there was a difference between
conditions in the percentage of use of positive
terms in the narratives. The fully unconditional
model indicated that 9.13% of the variability was
between subjects (τ00 = .37, z = 1.98, p = .02) and
TABLE 7
Total words and percentages of words in selected LIWC
categories (Experiment 2)
Mean (SD) Range for mean
Unique condition
Total word count 109.27 (61.24) 20–423
Perception 1.90 (1.74) 0–8.20
Positive affect 2.07 (2.05) 0–12.33
Negative affect 1.33 (1.51) 0–6.73
Cognitive insight 3.63 (2.09) 0–10.53
I 10.65 (3.70) 0–20.88
We 1.74 (2.24) 0–12.50
Social 8.62 (4.81) 0–28.12
Repeated condition
Total word count 106.09 (57.66) 16–274
Perception 1.96 (2.27) 0–13.41
Positive affect 2.11 (1.99) 0–10.45
Negative affect .65 (1.05) 0–4.50
Cognitive insight 2.79 (2.22) 0–11.54
I 8.23 (3.85) 1.09–18.42
We 2.38 (2.77) 0–15.09
Social 8.47 (4.50) 0–20.75
Word categories are not exhaustive. Hence, percentages do
not add up to 100.
TABLE 6
Logistic multilevel model results for emotion associated with
the memory (Experiment 2)
Variable
Estimate
(SE)
Odds
ratio LCI UCI
Fixed effects
Probability of emotion, β0
Intercept, γ00 .31 (.14) 1.37* 1.03 1.82
Condition slope, β1
Condition, γ10 −1.28 (.23) .28** .18 .44
Random effects
Variable level, τ00 0 (0)
Within-person
fluctuation, σ2
1.01** (.08)
LCI = lower boundary of the 95% confidence interval;
UCI = upper boundary of the 95% confidence interval.
Deviance = 446.35. n = 348 memories (10 memories were
excluded due to the absence of reports of associated emotion).
Standard error values are in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
CHILDHOOD REMEMBERED 11
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
em
or
ial
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ew
fo
un
dla
nd
] a
t 0
2:5
1 0
6 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
90.87% was within subjects (σ2 = 3.73, z = 12.14,
p < .0001). In the full model, condition (γ10 = .07,
t = 0.34, p = .74) was not significantly related to
positive words.
Negative affect. This model assessed whether
there was a difference between conditions in the
percentage of negative emotion words in the
narratives. The fully unconditional model indi-
cated that 8.77% of the variability was between
subjects (τ00 = .16, z = 1.92, p = .03) and 91.23%
was within subjects (σ2 = 1.71, z = 12.13, p <
.0001). When condition was added to the model,
condition (γ10 = −.67, t = −4.78, p < .0001) was
significantly related to percentage of negative
words, indicating that unique memories (M =
1.33, SD = 1.51) include a higher percentage of
negative words than repeated memories (M =
0.65, SD = 1.05). Approximately 6.43% of the
within-person variance in negative affect was
accounted for by condition.
Cognitive insight. This model assessed whether
there was a difference between conditions in the
percentage of cognitive insight words in the
narratives. The fully unconditional model indi-
cated that 18.02% of the variability was between
subjects (τ00 = .87, z = 2.64, p = .0042) and
81.98% was within subjects (σ2 = 3.97, z = 11.99,
p < .0001). When condition was added to the
model, condition (γ10 = −.81, t = −3.71, p = .0002)
was significantly related to percentage of cognit-
ive insight words, indicating that unique memor-
ies (M = 3.63, SD = 2.09) include a higher
percentage of cognitive insight words than
repeated memories (M = 2.79, SD = 2.22).
Approximately 3.97% of the within-person vari-
ance in cognitive insight was accounted for by
condition.
“I.” This model tested whether there was a
difference between conditions in the percentage
of the use of “I” in the narratives. The fully
unconditional model indicated that 8.50% of the
variability was between subjects (τ00 = 1.33, z =
1.84, p = .03) and 91.50% was within subjects
(σ2 = 14.32, z = 12.09, p < .0001). Gender
significantly predicted the use of “I” and there-
fore was included in the model. With gender and
condition in the model, the main effect of gender
was no longer significant (γ01 = −1.07, t = −2.01,
p = .05). However, there was a significant differ-
ence in the percentage of “I” terms in the narra-
tives, indicating that unique memories (M = 10.65,
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SD = 3.70) included a higher percentage of “I”
terms compared to repeated memories (M = 8.23,
SD = 3.85; γ10 = −2.32, t = −5.81, p < .0001).
Approximately 9.66% of the within-person vari-
ance was accounted for by condition.
“We.” This model tested whether there was a
difference between conditions in the percentage
of the word “we” in the narratives. The fully
unconditional model indicated that 13.45% of the
variability was between subjects (τ00 = .84, z =
2.58, p = .005) and 86.55% was within subjects
(σ2 = 5.42, z = 12.19, p < .0001). With condition in
the model, there was a significant difference in the
percentage of “we” in the narratives, indicating
that unique memories (M = 1.74, SD = 2.24)
included a lower percentage of “we” compared to
repeated memories (M = 2.38, SD = 2.77; γ10 =
.62, t = 2.43, p = .02). Approximately 1.52% of
the within-person variance was accounted for by
condition.
Social terms. This model examined whether
there was a difference between conditions in the
percentage of the social words in the narratives.
The fully unconditional model indicated that
10.85% of the variability was between subjects
(τ00 = 2.37, z = 2.21, p = .01) and 89.15% was
within subjects (σ2 = 19.49, z = 12.14, p < .0001).
In contrast to the results involving “we,” condi-
tion was not a significant predictor when added to
this model (γ10 = − .09, t = − 0.18, p = .86).
Discussion
This experiment allowed us to confirm the validity
of our categorisation of repeated versus unique
memories on the basis of the duration and fre-
quency of the reports of the former. Further, we
identified only a small number of repeated mem-
ories that were actually extended memories. The
results support the conclusion that memories for
repeated as well as unique childhood experiences
are available to emerging adults as sources of self-
definition. Further, the present findings clearly
establish that the similarities in ratings of both
biographical importance and personal significance
initially identified in Experiment 1 are robust
across methodology. In this experiment, the pre-
vious results were generally replicated, despite the
present reliance on narrative accounts of early
childhood experiences rather than on the genera-
tion of very short synopses of as many memories
as can be reported. Moreover, as indicated by a
comparison of Table 1 and Table 4, generally
similar levels of responding were observed across
the two experiments.
An examination of the content of the reported
memories corroborated the pattern of results that
emerged from the analysis of the ratings. Consist-
ent with participants’ reports of emotions asso-
ciated with the memories they generated in the
fluency task, the content of unique memories in
comparison to repeated memories included more
terms representing negative affect. However, the
memories did not differ with regard to words
denoting perception, even though a difference
could have corroborated the vividness ratings.
The greater density of terms referencing “I” and
indicating cognitive insight among the unique
memories was consistent with the identity and
self-direction functions, respectively, of memories
in this category (Waters et al., 2014). Moreover,
the higher percentage of “we” terms corresponded
to the role of repeated memories in social con-
nectedness (Waters et al., 2014), although the
absence of a difference in density of social terms
is counter to this hypothesis.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of these two experiments generally
converged across two divergent methods for
eliciting reports of childhood experiences. As
hypothesised on the basis of their greater distinc-
tiveness (Howe, 1997), unique memories were
more vivid than repeated memories. Nonetheless,
it is important to note that participants did not see
their repeated memories as vague recollections.
The mean ratings for the repeated as well as the
unique memories were all greater than 4.5 on a
7-point scale, and the full range of the scale was
used in both conditions.
Regardless of method, unique memories were
more likely to have a negative affective compon-
ent than were repeated memories, as predicted.
Unique memories were not only more likely to be
given a negative overall affective label by partici-
pants in both experiments, repeated memories
were less likely to have an associated negative
emotion compared to unique memories when
individual types of words were tabulated in
Experiment 2. In the current sample, highly neg-
ative events are likely to be relatively rare, unique,
and memorable. In contrast, events that happen
over and over are less likely to be negative.
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Most importantly, participants rated their
memories for unique and repeated events as
equivalently infused with personal meaning. In
addition, comparable percentages of unique and
repeated memories were assigned the highest
ratings. Approximately a fifth of the average
ratings of biographical and personal significance
of both types of memories were rated as very
important. These proportions may at first seem to
be high. However, many have seen early events
as having formative effects on the person (e.g.,
see Wilson, 1994, quoted above). Experiment 1
used a memory fluency task that elicits memor-
ies that are highly accessible, according to
Wang et al. (2004). The memories reported in
Experiment 2 were also readily accessible to
individuals. Since the events being recalled typic-
ally occurred over a decade previously, it is likely
that they were somehow salient to the individual
rather than a mere reflection of the typical
experiences of everyday life.
We realise that our conclusions involve the
interpretation of null findings. However, as
described above, we detected differences across
conditions, even though the magnitude of the
mean differences was not large, indicating that
the design had sufficient power to avoid Type B
errors. Further, the initial results as reported in
Experiment 1 were replicated in Experiment 2
using a different methodology.
An additional question regarding the pattern
of results could arise from the numbers of
memories that did not meet the criteria for
inclusion. These numbers admittedly represented
a sizeable corpus of repeated memories. We
emphasise that memories, not participants, were
deleted. Indeed, across the two experiments, only
one participant was excluded because he/she did
not provide any memories that met the age for
inclusion in the repeated memory condition in all
cases. It should also be noted that we used the
memory as the unit of analysis, rather than an
average of the characteristics of the memories
within the participant, as has traditionally been
analysed. This analytic strategy, which offered a
number of advantages, also made the disquali-
fication of specific memories more salient.
Our comparison of unique and repeated mem-
ories has three major implications for the under-
standing of autobiographical memory. First,
memories for early childhood events appear to
be an important component for constructing
personal identity. Waters et al. (2014) similarly
found that memories of both unique and repeated
events could serve a self-defining function,
although their corpus was likely to mostly consist
of relatively recent events. In their study, the self-
definition function was more prevalent in mem-
ories of unique events than of repeated ones; in
contrast, in the current study of very early life
events, unique and repeated memories were
equivalently significant. The difference between
the two studies may be because the types of
memories that one keeps for many years are
those that are preferentially salient. Alternatively,
differences between the two studies may be due
to different methodologies. Nevertheless, some
memories of early childhood events may become
part of the life story, even though individuals only
begin to construct life stories during adolescence
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams & McLean,
2013). The fact that a number of memories dating
from the preschool years were highly significant
and important for both biographical and personal
meaning indicates that they are likely to be
incorporated into a life story. After all, what is a
biography, as referenced in one of these ques-
tions, if not a life story?
Second, the results suggest that characterisa-
tions of autobiographical memory are incomplete
unless memories for repeated experiences are
included. In particular, autobiographical memory
cannot be limited to the consideration of memor-
ies for events that occurred only one time (cf.
Nelson & Fivush, 2004). More specifically, not all
reports of repeated events are general represen-
tations, as seems to be often assumed. Repeated
memories are vivid, infused with emotion, and
personally meaningful, as indicated by partici-
pants’ ratings in both experiments in this invest-
igation, and in these regards differ markedly from
scripted representations. Our analyses of the
content of repeated memories in Experiment 2
further indicate that they are distinct from
scripted representations, as evinced by the density
of first-person pronouns. Reports of repeated
events in this investigation did not differ from
unique event reports with regard to the inclusion
of perceptual detail and infusion with positive
emotion. Indeed, in a summary of their body of
research, Rubin and Umanath (2015) state that
whether an event memory was single or repeated
did not affect other properties of the memories.
There is also face validity for including repeated
memory in examinations of autobiographical
remembering. After all, lived experience consists
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to a large extent of events that occur on multiple
occasions during some periods of our lives. It may
also be the case that repeated experiences are
particularly characteristic of the everyday lives of
children, whose worlds are largely structured by
adults.
Finally, the results may call into question
widely used procedures for identifying over-gen-
eral memories. In most investigations of this
clinically relevant phenomenon (for review, see
Williams et al., 2007), repeated memories are
classified as over-general memories. In the widely
used criteria established for coding responses to
cue words in the autobiographical memory test
(Williams & Dritschel, 1992), memories are cate-
gorised as specific only if they refer to personally
experienced events that last less than a day.
Summarised categories of events as well as
repeated memories (e.g., Bunnell & Greenhoot,
2012) are classified as over-general memories. As
frequently applied, over-general memories are
defined as the inverse of specific memories; that
is, if memories are not specific they are over-
general. We suggest that this way of classifying
memories as over-general is too undifferentiated
(see also Rubin & Umanath, 2015; Williams &
Dritschel, 1992). Indeed, Waters (2014) found
that repeated memories were as highly correlated
with measures of psychological well-being as were
unique memories. Clinical correlates may well
vary if one differentiates the various types of
event memories that are not of specific unique
events rather than lumping them together as
“over-general memories.”
It is important to note that the task contexts in
which we observed remembering differ from the
method used to measure memory specificity and
that our characterisations of repeated memory
were obtained with a nonclinical, university sam-
ple. With regard to implications of the present
research for understanding over-general memory,
it is critical to replicate our characterisation of
repeated memories with a clinical sample. If these
results are generally replicated, then it is import-
ant to ask if characterisations of over-general
memory would be altered if repeated memories
were examined separately.
In addition to a replication with a clinical
sample, future examinations of repeated memor-
ies should avoid one of the limitations of the
present study. To reduce the number of memories
that cannot be analysed, research should provide
instructions that focus participants’ attention
specifically on a designated age range. It would
also likely be helpful to include a practice
procedure to help ensure that participants thor-
oughly understand the importance of limiting
their reports to events that did not endure beyond
the age criterion. Although the requirements of
the fluency task prohibit the interviewer from
reminding the participant of the instructions or
replacing memories that cannot be analysed, such
practices should be incorporated with methods
that elicit narrative accounts in procedures that
are not time limited.
The acknowledged limitations to our method
notwithstanding, the results of the present invest-
igation justify greater attention to repeated mem-
ories. Given their similarities to unique memories
on a number of measures and their rated bio-
graphical importance and personal significance as
replicated with different methods, repeated mem-
ories are important inclusions in investigations of
autobiographical remembering. Indeed, the un-
derstanding of autobiographical memory cannot
be complete without attention to memories for
experiences that transpire on multiple occasions.
To paraphrase Wilson (1994), both unique and
repeated experiences play a part in the creation
of identity.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to the participants for making this
research possible. We also thank Jennifer Johnson for
her effective management of data collection and Mary
T. Oliver for her assistance with data analysis. We also
appreciate the contributions of the interviewers: Jaclyn
Fitzsimmons, Elisabeth Gnida, Lauren Kollman, Annie
Kilroy, Leslie Lamb, and James Upright. Appreciation
is also expressed to Bristol Bowman, Megan Peedin,
and Tianna Soto, for their careful transcription and
data entry. We would also like to acknowledge Mea-
ghan Kennedy, whose undergraduate honour’s thesis
contributed a preliminary basis for the current research.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the
authors.
FUNDING
This work was partially supported by Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada [grant
number 513-02] to Carole Peterson.
CHILDHOOD REMEMBERED 15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
em
or
ial
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ew
fo
un
dla
nd
] a
t 0
2:5
1 0
6 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
REFERENCES
Artioli, F., Cicogna, P. C., Occhionero, M., & Reese, E.
(2012). “The people I grew up with”: The role of
sociodemographic factors in early memories in an
Italian sample.Memory, 20(2), 189–197. doi:10.1080/
09658211.2011.651090
Bauer, P. J. (2007). Remembering the times of our lives:
Memory in infancy and beyond. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Bauer, P. J., Burch, M. M., Scholin, S. E., & Guler, O. E.
(2007). Using cue words to investigate the distribu-
tion of autobiographical memories in childhood.
Psychological Science, 18, 910–916. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-9280.2007.01999.x
Bluck, S., Alea, N., Habermas, T., & Rubin, D. C.
(2005). A tale of three functions: The self-reported
uses of autobiographical memory. Social Cognition,
23(1), 91–117. doi:10.1080/09658211.2011.590500
Bruce, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, L., Robinson, J., Philips-
Grant, K., Francis, L., & Smith, M. (2005). Frag-
ment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21(3), 307–324.
doi:10.3758/bf03195324
Bunnell, S. L., & Greenhoot, A. F. (2012). When and
why does abuse predict reduced autobiographical
memory specificity? Memory, 21, 2–8. doi:10.1080/
09658211.2011.648197
Cleveland, E. S., & Reese, E. (2008). Children remem-
ber early childhood: Long-term recall across the
offset of childhood amnesia. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 22(1), 127–142. doi:10.1002/acp.1359
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The
construction of autobiographical memories in the
self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2),
261–288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261
Guo, G., & Zhao, H. (2000). Multilevel modeling for
binary data. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 441–
462. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.441
Habermas, T., & Bluck, S. (2000). Getting a life: The
emergence of the life story in adolescence. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 126, 748–769. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.126.5.748
Howe, M. L. (1997). Children's memory for traumatic
experiences. Learning and Individual Differences,
9(2), 153–174. doi:10.1016/S1041-6080(97)90004-2
Jack, F., & Hayne, H. (2007). Eliciting adults’ earliest
memories: Does it matter how we ask the question?
Memory, 15, 647–663. doi:10.1080/09658210701
467087
Jack, F., MacDonald, S., Reese, E., & Hayne, H.
(2009). Maternal reminiscing style during early
childhood predicts the age of adolescents’ earliest
memories. Child Development, 80, 496–505. doi:10.
1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01274.x
Jansari, A., & Parkin, A. J. (1996). Things that go
bump in your life: Explaining the reminiscence
bump in autobiographical memory. Psychology
and Aging, 11(1), 85–91. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.11.
1.85
McAdams, D. P., & McLean, K. C. (2013). Narrative
identity. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
22(3), 233–238. doi:10.1177/0963721413475622
Morris, G., Baker-Ward, L., & Bauer, P. J. (2010).
What remains of that day: The survival of children’s
autobiographical memories across time. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 24, 527–544. doi:10.1002/
acp.1567
Mullen, M. K. (1994). Earliest recollections of child-
hood: A demographic analysis. Cognition, 52(1), 55–
79. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90004-3
Nelson, K. (Ed.) (1986). Event knowledge: Structure
and function in development. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawr-
ence Erlbaum.
Nelson, K., & Fivush, R. (2004). The emergence of
autobiographical memory: A social cultural devel-
opmental theory. Psychological Review, 111, 486–
511. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.486
Nelson, K., & Gruendel, J. (1986). Children’s scripts. In
K. Nelson (Ed.), Event knowledge: Structure and
function in development (pp. 21–46). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Pennebaker, J. W., Booth, R. J., & Francis, M. E
(2007). Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count: LIWC
[Computer software]. Austin, TX: LIWC.net.
Pennebaker, J. W., Chung, C. K., Ireland, M., Gonzales,
A., & Booth, R. J. (2007). The development and
psychometric properties of LIWC2007. Austin, TX:
LIWC.net.
Peterson, C., Bonechi, A., Smorti, A., & Tani, F.
(2010). A distant mirror: Memories of parents and
friends across childhood and adolescence. British
Journal of Psychology, 101, 601–620. doi:10.1348/
000712609X478835
Peterson, C., Grant, V. V., & Boland, L. D. (2005).
Childhood amnesia in children and adolescents:
Their earliest memories. Memory, 13, 622–637.
doi:10.1080/09658210444000278
Peterson, C., Morris, G., Baker-Ward, L., & Flynn, S.
(2014). Predicting which childhood memories
persist: Contributions of memory characteristics.
Developmental Psychology, 50, 439–448. doi:10.1037/
a0033221
Peterson, C., & Nguyen, D. T. K. (2010). Parent-child
relationship quality and infantile amnesia in adults.
British Journal of Psychology, 101, 719–737.
doi:10.1348/000712609X482948
Peterson, C., Smorti, A., & Tani, F. (2008). Parental
influences on earliest memories. Memory, 16, 569–
578. doi:10.1080/02687030802025984
Peterson, C., Wang, Q., & Hou, Y. (2009). “When I was
little”: Childhood recollections in Chinese and Euro-
pean Canadian grade school girls. Child Develop-
ment, 80, 506–518. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.
01275.x
Picard, L., Reffuveille, I., Eustache, F., & Piolino, P.
(2009). Development of autonoetic autobiographical
memory in school-age children: Genuine age effect
or development of basic cognitive abilities? Con-
sciousness and Cognition, 18, 864–876. doi:10.1016/j.
concog.2009.07.008
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical
linear models: Applications and data analysis meth-
ods (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Reese, E., Jack, F., & White, N. (2010). Origins of ado‐
lescents’ autobiographical memories. Cognitive
16 PETERSON, BAKER-WARD, GROVENSTEIN
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
em
or
ial
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ew
fo
un
dla
nd
] a
t 0
2:5
1 0
6 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
Development, 25, 352–367. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.
2010.08.006
Rubin, D. C. (2000). The distribution of early child-
hood memories. Memory, 8(4), 265–269. doi:10.
1080/096582100406810
Rubin, D. C., & Umanath, S. (2015). Event memory: A
theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical,
and fictional events. Psychological Review, 122(1),
1–23. doi:10.1037/a0037907
Schank, R., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans,
goals and understanding: An inquiry into human
knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Singer, J. D. (1998). Using SAS PROC MIXED to
fit multilevel models, hierarchical models, and indi-
vidual growth models. Journal of Educational and
Behavioral Statistics, 24(4), 323–355. doi:10.3102/
10769986023004323
Talarico, J. M., LaBar, K. S., & Rubin, D. C. (2004).
Emotional intensity predicts autobiographical mem-
ory experience. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1118–
1132. doi:10.3758/BF03196886
Tustin, K., & Hayne, H. (2010). Defining the boundary:
Age-related changes in childhood amnesia. Devel-
opmental Psychology, 46, 1049–1061. doi:10.1037/
a0020105
Wang, Q. (2006). Relations of maternal style and
child self-concept to autobiographical memories in
Chinese, Chinese immigrant, and European Amer-
ican 3-year-olds. Child Development, 77, 1794–1809.
doi:10.1002/acp.2976
Wang, Q., Conway, M. A., & Hou, Y. (2004). Infantile
amnesia: A cross-cultural investigation. Cognitive
Sciences, 1(1), 123–135.
Waters, T. E. A. (2014). Relations between the func-
tions of autobiographical memory and psychological
wellbeing. Memory, 22(3), 265–275. doi:1080/0965
8211.2013.778293
Waters, T. E. A., Bauer, P. J., & Fivush, R. (2014).
Autobiographical memory functions served by mul-
tiple event types autobiographical memory functions.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(2), 185–195.
doi:10.1002/acp.2976
Williams, J., & Dritschel, B. (1992). Categoric and
extended autobiographical memories. In M. Conway,
D. Rubin, H. Spinnler, & W. Wagenaar (Eds.),
Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory
(pp. 391–410). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic.
Williams, J. M. G., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Herman,
D., Raes, F., Watkins, E., & Dalgleish, T. (2007).
Autobiographical memory specificity and emotional
disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 122–148.
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.122
Wilson, E. O. (1994). Naturalist. Washington D.C.:
Island Press.
CHILDHOOD REMEMBERED 17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
em
or
ial
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ew
fo
un
dla
nd
] a
t 0
2:5
1 0
6 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
